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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
John Doe appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his 
claims against public officials and local government entities 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  He claims 
the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion 
to proceed anonymously and, when he failed to proceed using 
his real name, by dismissing his claims with prejudice.  For 
the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
This case centers on whether the District Court‟s 
decision to require Doe to litigate under his own name or face 
dismissal constituted an abuse of the District Court‟s 
discretion. 
Doe‟s underlying claims are based on an email sent by 
Thomas Megless, Security Director of Upper Merion School 
District, and Ronald Fonock, Chief of Police of Upper Merion 
Township, to a distribution list of public officials and private 
citizens instructing them “if you see this person in or around 
the district schools, please contact the police.”  (App. at A72-
73.)  The email allegedly included a flyer attachment, which 
used Doe‟s real name and stated:  “[Doe] has been known to 
hang around schools in Upper Merion and other townships.  
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He has not approached any kids at this point.  [Doe]‟s mental 
status is unknown.  If seen stop and investigate.”  (Id. at 
A73.)  The email contained his picture, his home address, the 
make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his 
Pennsylvania driver‟s license number.  He asserts that the 
email was intended to (1) characterize him as a dangerous and 
potentially mentally unstable pedophile,1 (2) authorize all 
recipients to stop and detain Doe on sight, and (3) authorize 
all recipients to investigate him. 
Doe filed a complaint against Megless, Fonock, the 
Upper Merion Area School District, the Upper Merion Area 
School District Board of Directors, and Upper Merion 
Township (collectively the “Township”).  He asserted several 
causes of action based on the sending and distribution of the 
email and flyer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged that 
the Township (1) deprived him of his freedom of movement, 
(2) illegally seized his personal records, (3) violated his right 
to privacy, (4) conspired, and (5) failed to train, supervise and 
discipline agents. 
In addition to his complaint, Doe filed a motion to 
proceed anonymously and an amended complaint.  The 
Township filed a motion in opposition.  The District Court 
denied his motion to proceed anonymously and directed him 
to file a complaint under his real name no later than August 
20, 2010.  The District Court advised Doe that failure to 
comply would result in dismissal of the action with prejudice.  
Despite the District Court‟s warning, the deadline passed, and 
                                                 
1
 Neither the email nor the flyer used the word 
pedophile; the word was first used in Doe‟s complaint. 
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Doe conveyed his intention not to file a complaint under his 
real name.  On September 22, 2010, the District Court granted 
the Township‟s motion to dismiss Doe‟s amended complaint 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  Doe filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
district court‟s decision to deny a plaintiff permission to 
proceed anonymously for abuse of discretion.  Doe v. 
C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “An abuse of discretion arises when the district court's 
decision „rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.‟”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 
F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.1993)). 
“An abuse of discretion can also occur when no 
reasonable person would adopt the district 
court's view.  We will not interfere with the 
district court's exercise of discretion unless 
there is a definite and firm conviction that the 
court below committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a 
weighing of the relevant factors.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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Doe asserts that the District Court abused its discretion 
by denying his motion to proceed anonymously and by 
subsequently dismissing his claims.  We address each issue in 
turn. 
III. 
 “[O]ne of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice 
[is] that its proceedings should be public.”  Daubney v. 
Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 441 (K.B. 1829); Nixon v. 
Warner Cmmc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978).  Rule 
10(a) requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in 
their respective pleadings.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); Doe v. 
Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992).  Courts have 
explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) 
illustrates “the principle that judicial proceedings, civil as 
well as criminal, are to be conducted in public.”  Doe v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 
1997).  “Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an 
important dimension of publicness.  The people have a right 
to know who is using their courts.”  Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 
872; Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).  And, defendants have a right to 
confront their accusers.  See S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of 
Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 
(5th Cir. 1979).  A plaintiff‟s use of a pseudonym “runs afoul 
of the public‟s common law right of access to judicial 
proceedings.”  Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 
214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 While not expressly permitted under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 10(a), in exceptional cases courts have 
allowed a party to proceed anonymously.  See, e.g., C.A.R.S., 
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527 F.3d at 371 n.2.  That a plaintiff may suffer 
embarrassment or economic harm is not enough.  Id.  Instead, 
a plaintiff must show “both (1) a fear of severe harm, and 
(2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.”  Doe v. 
Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 
1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).  Examples of areas where courts 
have allowed pseudonyms include cases involving “abortion, 
birth control, transexuality, mental illness, welfare rights of 
illegitimate children, AIDS, and homosexuality.”  Doe v. 
Borough of Morrisville, 130 F.R.D. 612, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 While we have affirmed district courts‟ decisions on 
motions to proceed anonymously, we have never set out a test 
for courts to apply to determine if a litigant‟s reasonable fear 
of severe harm outweighs the public‟s interest in open judicial 
proceedings.  C.A.R.S., 527 F.3d at 371 n.2.  Many of our 
sister courts of appeals have provided such guidance.  See, 
e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-
90 (2d Cir. 2008); Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 
2004); Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068; M.M. v. 
Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998); James v. 
Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993); Frank, 951 F.2d at 
323; Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. Unit A 
1981).  When a litigant sufficiently alleges that he or she has 
a reasonable fear of severe harm from litigating without a 
pseudonym, courts of appeals are in agreement that district 
courts should balance a plaintiff‟s interest and fear against the 
public‟s strong interest in an open litigation process.  Sealed 
Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 189-90; Porter, 370 F.3d at 560; 
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068; Zavaras, 139 F.3d 
at 803; Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 242; Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; 
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Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.  While the courts of appeals have 
agreed that district courts should apply a balancing test, each 
case presents a slightly different list of factors for courts to 
consider.2  While one could conclude that there is a conflict as 
                                                 
2
 Compare Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190 (directing 
courts to consider (1) whether the litigation involves matters 
that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature; (2) whether 
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical harm or 
mental harm to the party seeking to proceed anonymously or 
even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) whether 
identification presents other harms and the likely severity of 
those harms, including whether the injury litigated against 
would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the 
plaintiff‟s identity; (4) whether the plaintiff is particularly 
vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure; (5) whether 
the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of 
private parties; (6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by 
allowing the plaintiff to press his claims anonymously, and 
whether any prejudice can be mitigated by the district court; 
(7) whether the plaintiff‟s identity has thus far been kept 
confidential; (8) whether the public‟s interest in the litigation 
is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his identity; 
(9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues 
presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public 
interest in knowing the litigants‟ identities; and (10) whether 
there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the 
confidentiality of the plaintiff) with Advanced Textile Corp., 
214 F.3d at 1068 (directing courts to consider (1) the severity 
of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the 
anonymous party‟s fears; (3) the anonymous party‟s 
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a result of the different factors, each court has agreed that 
their list of factors is not exhaustive.  See, e.g., id.  Further, 
each court agrees that the purpose of the balancing test is to 
allow a district court to determine whether a litigant has a 
reasonable fear of severe harm that outweighs the public‟s 
interest in open litigation.  Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d at 
1043. 
Courts within our circuit have been balancing these 
competing interests for the last fifteen years without our 
guidance.  See, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001).  They have primarily relied on a test for the use of 
pseudonyms set forth in Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. 
Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  That case set forth 
a non-exhaustive list of factors to be weighed both in favor of 
anonymity and also factors that favor the traditional rule of 
openness.  Id.  The factors in favor of anonymity included: 
“(1) the extent to which the identity of the 
litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases 
upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be 
avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; 
(3) the magnitude of the public interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant‟s 
identity; (4) whether, because of the purely 
legal nature of the issues presented or 
                                                                                                             
vulnerability to such retaliation; (4) the prejudice to the 
opposing party; (5) whether the proceedings can be structured 
to mitigate that prejudice; and (6) whether the public‟s 
interest would be best served by requiring the litigants to 
reveal their identities). 
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otherwise, there is an atypically weak public 
interest in knowing the litigant‟s identities; (5) 
the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the 
pseudonymous party and attributable to his 
refusal to pursue the case at the price of being 
publicly identified; and (6) whether the party 
seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate 
ulterior motives.” 
Id. at 467-68.  On the other side of the scale, factors 
disfavoring anonymity included: 
“(1) the universal level of public interest in 
access to the identities of litigants; (2) whether, 
because of the subject matter of this litigation, 
the status of the litigant as a public figure, or 
otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest 
in knowing the litigant‟s identities, beyond the 
public‟s interest which is normally obtained; 
and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym 
by counsel, the public, or the press is 
illegitimately motivated.” 
Id.  The Provident Life Court noted that its list of factors is 
not comprehensive, and that trial courts “will always be 
required to consider those [other] factors which the facts of 
the particular case implicate.”  Id. at 468.  District courts have 
applied these nine factors successfully and without further 
guidance.  See, e.g., Doe v. United Behavioral Health, No. 
10-5192, -- F.R.D. ---, 2010 WL 5173206 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 10, 2010); F.B. v. East Stroudsburg Univ., No. 
3:09cv525, --F.R.D.---, 2009 WL 2003363 at *2 (M.D. Pa. 
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July 7, 2009); Doe v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 237 
F.R.D. 545, 548 (D.N.J. 2006); Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 175-76.  
As district courts have been able to apply the Provident Life 
test and it does not conflict with the tests that have been 
adopted by our sister circuits, we see no value in upsetting its 
application.  Accordingly, we endorse it. 
Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Doe would not suffer substantial harm that 
might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open 
trial.  It correctly applied the Provident Life test.  Doe v. 
Megless, 2010 WL 3076246, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2010).  
Because the flyer neither accused Doe of criminal behavior or 
mental illness, nor disclosed highly sensitive personal 
information, he did not demonstrate that disclosing his 
identity would cause him substantial “irreparable harm.”  Id. 
at *3. 
Addressing each factor in order, first, has the identity 
of the litigant been kept confidential?  At no point has Doe‟s 
identity been confidential.  As the District Court recognized, 
“The flyer which forms the basis of Plaintiff‟s complaint [], 
reveals his identity to the public.  It was sent to many Upper 
Merion residents, and countless people in the community 
viewed it.”  Id. at *5.  We note that this is not a situation 
where an opposing litigant publicized the identity of a party 
that wished to remain confidential with the intention of 
defeating a motion to proceed anonymously.  Second, what 
harm is the litigant seeking to avoid, and is the litigant‟s fear 
reasonable?  Doe fears that if others learn of his identity, they 
will believe that he is a pedophile.  As the District Court 
noted, “[w]hile there are social stigmas attached to pedophilic 
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behavior, whether Plaintiff is a pedophile is not at issue here.  
Instead, the question is whether Defendants can be liable for 
distributing a flyer stating Plaintiff was acting suspiciously in 
the vicinity of schools.”  Id. at 6.  Further, to the extent that 
the flyers publicly accused him of being a pedophile, 
litigating publicly will afford Doe the opportunity to clear his 
name in the community.  Litigating publicly will not 
contribute further to the harm that he alleges has already 
occurred.  Third, if this litigant is forced to reveal his or her 
name, will other similarly situated litigants be deterred from 
litigating claims that the public would like to have litigated?  
There is no evidence that requiring Doe to disclose his name 
will deter other similarly situated plaintiffs from suing in the 
future.  As the District Court recognized, there is no 
allegation that falsely created suspicious persons alerts are a 
widespread problem in Upper Merion.  Id.  Fourth, are the 
facts not relevant to the outcome of the claim?  Doe‟s claim is 
not a purely legal claim.  As the District Court recognized, 
“[t]his case is fact-sensitive because Plaintiff alleges 
Defendants illegally seized his department of motor vehicle 
data and prevented his freedom of movement in the 
community.”  Id.  Fifth, will the claim be resolved on its 
merits if the litigant is denied the opportunity to proceed 
using a pseudonym, or will the litigant potentially sacrifice a 
potentially valid claim simply to preserve their anonymity?  
The fifth factor weighs in Doe‟s favor.  Doe argued that the 
public is harmed when alleged abuses of power by public 
officials go unchallenged because plaintiffs fear litigating 
publicly.  The District Court recognized that this position has 
merit.  Id. at 7.  We too recognize that it has merit, however, a 
plaintiff‟s stubborn refusal to litigate openly by itself cannot 
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outweigh the public‟s interest in open trials.  Sixth, is the 
litigant seeking to use a pseudonym for nefarious reasons?  
There is no allegation that Doe has an illegal or ulterior 
motive in his desire to hide his name.  Only the fifth factor 
weighs in favor of allowing Doe to proceed anonymously. 
Turning to the next grouping of factors, first, we must 
acknowledge the thumb on the scale that is the universal 
interest in favor of open judicial proceedings.  There is 
universal public interest in access to the identities of litigants.  
This weighs in favor of disclosing Doe‟s identity.  Second, 
does the subject of the litigation heighten the public‟s 
interest?  Here, interest “is heightened because Defendants 
are public officials and government bodies.”  Id.  This factor 
supports disclosure of Doe‟s identity.  Finally, is the party 
opposing the use of a pseudonym doing so based on nefarious 
reasons?  Here, the District Court concluded that the 
Township did not have illegitimate ulterior motives.  Id.  
There is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise. 
Having reviewed the factors, we cannot conclude that 
no reasonable person would agree with the District Court‟s 
decision to deny Doe‟s motion to proceed anonymously.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Doe‟s motion to proceed anonymously. 
IV. 
Doe further claims the District Court erred by granting 
the Township‟s motion for dismissal.  We review a District 
Court‟s dismissal of a plaintiff‟s claim pursuant to R. Civ. P. 
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41(b) for an abuse of discretion.3  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 
252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 
F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
The District Court offered two bases for granting the 
Township‟s motion for dismissal: failure to prosecute and a 
balancing of the Poulis factors.  Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  Either basis was 
sufficient. 
First, Doe refused to proceed in accordance with the 
District Court‟s orders.  “A party disappointed with a court‟s 
ruling may not refuse to proceed and then expect to obtain 
relief on appeal from an order of dismissal or default.”  Spain 
v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Guyer 
v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff‟s] 
position made adjudication of the case impossible.  Therefore, 
any lesser sanction would not have furthered the interests of 
justice.”).  The District Court did not clearly err in 
determining that “[b]ecause Doe‟s conduct makes 
adjudication of the case impossible, dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) is appropriate, even without consideration of the 
Poulis factors.”  (App. at A14.) 
Additionally, district courts ordinarily balance six 
factors prior to dismissing a case pursuant to Rule 41(b):  
(1) the party‟s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) willfulness or bad 
                                                 
3
 “Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a 
dismissal under this subdivision (b) . . . operates as an 
adjudication on the merits.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
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faith; (5) the availability of alternative sanctions; and (6) the 
merit of the claim or defense.  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.  
“[N]ot all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to 
dismiss a complaint.”  Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 
(3d Cir. 1992).  We recognize that dismissals with prejudice 
are “drastic sanctions.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867.  However, 
the District Court did not clearly err in finding that five of the 
six factors weighed in favor of dismissal--each factor except 
history of dilatoriness.  (App. at 14.)  The District Court 
found that Doe was personally responsible for willfully 
obstructing the proceedings, thereby prejudicing the 
defendants, leaving the District Court with no alternative, and 
preventing the parties from reaching the merits of Doe‟s 
claims.  Moreover, the District Court provided ample warning 
that failure to comply would likely result in dismissal. 
In sum, the District Court provided two independently 
sufficient reasons for dismissing Doe‟s claims: Doe refused to 
prosecute in compliance with court orders and the relevant 
factors favored dismissal.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by dismissing Doe‟s claims pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
V. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District 
Court. 
